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ABSTRACT
The fact that modern Networked Industrial Control Systems (NICS) depend on Information and
Communications Technologies (ICT) is well known. Although many studies have focused on the
security of NICS, today we still lack a proper understanding of the impact that network parameters,
e.g. network delays, packet losses, background traffic, and network design decisions, have on cyber
attacks targeting NICS. In this paper we investigate the impact of network parameters on cyber
attacks targeting industrial processes. Our analysis is based on the Tennessee-Eastman chemical
process and proves that network parameters have a limited effect on remote cyber attacks.
Keywords: Cyber-physical, attack, network parameters, security, resilience.
1 Introduction
Modern Critical Infrastructures (CI), e.g. power plants,
water plants and smart grids, rely on Information and Com-
munications Technologies (ICT) for their operation since
ICT can lead to cost optimization as well as greater effi-
ciency, flexibility and interoperability between components.
In the past CIs were isolated environments and used propri-
etary hardware and protocols, limiting thus the threats that
could affect them. Nowadays CIs, or more specifically Net-
worked Industrial Control Systems (NICS), are exposed to
significant cyber-threats; a fact that has been highlighted by
many studies on the security of Supervisory Control And
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems [1, 2]. The recently
reported Stuxnet worm [3] is the first malware specifically
designed to attack NICS. Its ability to reprogram the logic
of control hardware in order to alter the operation of indus-
trial processes demonstrated how powerful such threats can
be.
In this paper we investigate the relationship between net-
work parameters and cyber attacks targeting industrial pro-
cesses. The main goal of our study is to evaluate the im-
pact of network communication parameters on the outcome
of remote cyber attacks. The network parameters included
in our study are communications delays, packet losses and
background traffic, that are typical to Internet communica-
tions. The adversary model included in the analysis is ca-
pable to communicate with control hardware through legiti-
mate packets. As a physical process we used the Tennessee-
Eastman chemical process [4] and the associated multi-loop
control system [5].
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Related
work is presented in Section 2, while Section 3 discusses
the investigation methodology. Then, Section 4 presents the
results of our investigations and the paper concludes in Sec-
tion 5.
2 Related Work
We start with approaches that assume an adversary that
is capable to interact with control hardware using legitimate
packets, but is not able to reprogram the control hardware.
In this context we find the work of Zhu, et al. [6], that fo-
cused on securing communications protocols and proposed
a secure routing protocol to increase the resilience of Smart
Grids. In their work, Nai Fovino, et al. [7] proposed a
K-resilient system together with lightweight cryptography
to ensure that running one single command on a control
hardware would require the confirmation from K nodes.
The importance of cryptography to secure communications
was also highlighted in several other approaches [8, 9, 10].
However, these techniques, together with [6] and [7], do
not address more sophisticated attacks that manage to com-
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 promise secure communications protocols and finally repro-
gram the logic of control hardware.
In the context of the same adversary model are placed the
work of Germanus, et al. [11] and the work of Avallone, et
al. [12]. Instead of focusing on cryptographic measures,
the two approaches proposed network architectures to in-
crease the resilience of SCADA systems. The work of Ger-
manus, et al. [11] employed a peer-to-peer (P2P) overlay
network in which P2P communications between redundant
nodes were used to implement path redundancy and data
replication. On the other hand, Avallone, et al. [12] pro-
posed to split packets and send them on two node-disjoint
paths in order to limit the adversary’s capability to recon-
struct the entire information flow.
3 Investigation Methodology
As already stated, our investigation focuses on identify-
ing network parameters that affect cyber attacks targeting
industrial processes. For this purpose one could employ
experimentation with real systems, software simulators or
emulators. Unfortunately, experimentation with production
systems suffers from the inability to control the experiment
environment in order to reproduce the results. Furthermore,
if the study intends to test the resilience or security of a
system, there are obvious concerns about the potential side
effects (faults and disruptions) to mission critical services.
Software based simulation has always been considered an
efficient approach to study physical systems, mainly be-
cause it can offer low-cost, fast and accurate analysis. Nev-
ertheless, it has limited applicability in the context of cyber
security due to the diversity and complexity of computer
networks. Software simulators can effectively model nor-
mal operations, but fail to capture the way computer sys-
tems fail.
Based on these facts in our study we have chosen a hy-
brid approach in between the two extremes of pure simula-
tion and experimentation with only real components. That
is, we employed an Emulab-based testbed [13, 14] to recre-
ate the control and process network of NICS, including con-
trol hardware and servers, and a software simulation to re-
produce the industrial processes. For the industrial pro-
cess we used the Tennessee-Eastman (TE) chemical process
model [4] and the associated multi-loop control system de-
veloped by Sozio [5].
3.1 Process Control Architecture
Overview
Modern process control architectures have two different
control layers: (i) the physical layer, which comprises actu-
ators, sensors and hardware devices that physically perform
the actions on the system (e.g. open a valve, measure the
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Fig. 1: Process control architecture
voltage, etc.); and (ii) the cyber layer, which comprises all
the information and communications devices and software
that acquire data, elaborate low-level process strategies and
deliver the commands to the physical layer. The cyber layer
typically uses SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Ac-
quisition) protocols to control and manage an industrial in-
stallation. The entire architecture can be viewed as a “dis-
tributed control system” spread among two networks: the
control network and the process network. The process
network usually hosts the SCADA servers (also known as
SCADA masters), human-machine interfaces (HMIs), do-
main controllers and other installation-specific nodes, e.g.
engineering stations, maintenance servers. The control net-
work hosts all the devices that on one side control the ac-
tuators and sensors of the physical layer and on the other
side provide the control interface to the process network.
A typical control network is composed of a mesh of PLCs
(Programmable Logic Controllers), as shown in Fig. 1.
3.2 Experimentation Framework Archi-
tecture
The experimentation framework developed in our pre-
vious work [15, 16] follows a hybrid approach, where the
Emulab-based testbed recreates the control and process net-
work of NICS, including PLCs and SCADA servers, and
a software simulation reproduces the industrial processes.
The architecture, as shown in Fig. 2, clearly distinguishes
3 layers: the cyber layer, the physical layer and a link layer
in between. The cyber layer includes regular ICT compo-
nents used in SCADA systems, while the physical layer pro-
vides the simulation of physical devices. The link layer (i.e.
cyber-physical layer) provides the “glue” between the two
layers through the use of a shared memory region.
The physical layer is recreated through a soft real-time
simulator that runs within the SC (Simulation Core) unit and
executes a model of the industrial process. The cyber layer
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is recreated by an emulation testbed that uses the Emulab
architecture and software [13, 14] to automatically and dy-
namically map physical components (e.g. servers, switches)
to a virtual topology. Besides the process network, the cy-
ber layer also includes the control logic code that in the real
world is run by PLCs. The control code can be run sequen-
tially or in parallel to the physical model.
3.3 The Tennessee-Eastman Chemical
Process
As pointed out by other authors as well [4, 17, 18], the
complexity of the Tennessee-Eastman (TE) chemical pro-
cess makes it suitable for a wide range of topics, such as
process-wide control strategy, non-linear control or multi-
variable control. Recently, the TE process was also used
in several security-related studies [19, 20], that add another
important topic to the previous list.
The TE chemical plant is a process with 41 measured pa-
rameters and 12 manipulated variables. Out of the 12 vari-
ables throughout the literature we find control loops defined
for 11 variables only, as for the last one (i.e. agitator speed
control valve) it is not desirable to close the loop (McAvoy
and Ye [17]). We briefly describe the process architecture
and PLCs in Fig. 3.
3.4 Adversary Model and Attack Scenar-
ios
The conducted experiment included a powerful adver-
sary model and the TE industrial process . The main goal of
the adversary was to cause the process parameters to reach
their shut down limits (SDLs). As pointed out by Ca´rdenas,
et al. [19] attacks targeting the minimum/maximum value
of parameters/control variables are the ones that can dam-
age the process in relatively short time periods. Such attacks
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Fig. 3: Architecture of the Tennessee-Eastman process
cause the accumulation of products (e.g. steam, water, fuel)
by completely opening valves (feed-valves) that feed prod-
ucts into process units and completely closing valves (free-
valves) that free products from the process units. In both
our models the adversary followed the same procedure to
force the industrial process to shut down. More specifically,
based on the documentation provided by Downs and Vogel
[4] we identified the feed-valves and free-valves of the TE
process and we employed OPEN commands for PLCs con-
trolling feed-valves and CLOSE commands for PLCs con-
trolling free-valves.
3.5 Experiment Implementation
The experiments were implemented in the Joint Re-
search Centre’s (JRC) Experimental Platform for Internet
Contingencies (EPIC) laboratory. The Emulab testbed in-
cluded nodes with the following configuration: FreeBSD
OS 8, AMD Athlon Dual Core CPU at 2.3GHz and 4GB of
RAM.
4 Experimental Results
We start our presentation with the normal operation of
the TE process. Then, we move on to the results from the
attack scenario described in the previous section.
4.1 Normal Operation of the Tennessee-
Eastman Process
The operation of the TE process for 40h without any dis-
turbances is shown in Fig. 4, where the target set-points are
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Fig. 4: Normal operation of the Tennessee-Eastman process for 40h without any disturbances: Reactor pressure (a), Reactor
level (b), Reactor temperature (c), Separator level (d), and Stripper level (e).
illustrated with a dashed line. With the implemented control
loops the process is able to run in a steady-state, as shown
by the five sub-figures depicting the behavior of the param-
eters that could trigger a shut down of the process. Without
these control loops, process parameters would reach their
shut down limits (SDLs) after approximately 3.6h [5].
4.2 Effect of Network Delays
Next, we measured the effect of network delays on the
process SDT. For the full network setting, the effect of de-
lays is insignificant, as up to 0.5s the SDT does not show
any changes. On the other hand, for network delays of 1s
the value of the SDT increased to 4.83min, while for delays
of 3s the SDT increased to 5.51min. However, such extreme
delays can rarely be measured over the Internet, and even in
such cases the impact on the attack is minimal. The effect of
network delays on the cyber attack targeting the TE process
is shown in Figure 5.
4.3 Effect of Packet Losses
In the next step we analyzed the effect of packet losses.
Packet loss rates of 5% increased the SDT of the full net-
work setting to 5.16min. However, extreme packet losses of
10% had an insignificant effect on the SDT and increased it
to only 5.58min in the same setting. Similarly to the study
of network delays, we can conclude that significant effects
are measured only for extreme packet losses that can rarely
be found in real settings. The effect of packet losses on the
cyber attack targeting the TE process is shown in Figure 6
4.4 Effect of Background Traffic
Finally, we analyzed the effect of background traffic. In
this case the increase in the background traffic to 5Mbit/s
did not produce significant changes in most of the im-
plemented settings. However, by increasing the traffic to
10Mbit/s, i.e. the maximum capacity of the external net-
work, the SDT showed major changes. Starting with the
full network setting, the SDT increased to almost twice its
initial value, i.e. 7.91min. Such change is mainly caused by
the excessive background traffic that lead to network con-
gestions and finally to packet losses and additional delays.
The behavior of the TE process for the two background traf-
fic parameters was illustrated in Fig. 7.
4.5 Discussion
The main goal of this study was not to be exhaustive in
the choice of network parameters, but to show that these
might play an important role in the outcome of cyber at-
tacks, given that specific conditions are met. The results
from this section showed that the studied parameters have
a significant effect on the outcome of cyber attacks only in
case of extreme network conditions.
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Throughout our study we found that network delays have
the least effect on cyber attacks. This is mainly because
packets are not lost, but only delayed and at the end are
able to reach their target. On the other hand, the effect of
packet losses is more obvious and in extreme cases can even
double the value of the SDT. The main cause of this is that
packet losses lead to major delays caused by timeouts in the
transport layer. It is a well-known fact that network time-
outs cause the retransmission of packets, which might occur
more than once for each loosed packet. However, out of the
three communications-related parameters, the most signif-
icant effect was recorded for network congestions. These
were caused by a background traffic equal to the network
capacity. In some cases this setting increased the value of
the SDT by three or even four times. Nevertheless, such
highly congestioned networks can rarely be found in prac-
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tice and even so, the adversary could launch the attack from
several locations in order to ensure the successful outcome
of the attack.
5 Conclusions
The study conducted in this paper employed an experi-
mental approach to show that network communication pa-
rameters have a significant effect on the outcome of cyber
attacks targeting CIs only in extreme cases. The studied
parameters illustrated that communications-related parame-
ters such as network delays, packet losses and background
traffic can cause a significant impact only in case of extreme
values that are rarely measured in practice. Nevertheless,
it is also worth mentioning that if the attack is extremely
time-dependent than even moderate changes in the network
traffic can affect the cyber attack. As future work we intend
to investigate other network parameters and develop novel
countermeasure or techniques for designing more resilient
CIs.
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